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THE LEGAL PROFESSION AS A BLUE STATE:
REFLECTIONS ON PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY,
JURISPRUDENCE, AND LEGAL ETHICS
Russell G. Pearce*
INTRODUCTION
Many conservative commentators view the legal profession as a Blue
State-as a captive of the Democratic Party and political liberalism.' They
assert that most lawyers vote for Democratic presidential candidates. 2 They
attack the American Bar Association for supporting abortion rights and
equal rights for lesbians and gays and argue that it gives preferred treatment
to Democratic nominees to the federal courts.3  Many opposed the
nomination of Harriet Miers to the Supreme Court on the ground that she
lacks "'the spine and steel necessary to resist the pressures that constantly
bend the American legal system toward the left.' 4 They create law schools
* Edward & Marilyn Bellet Professor of Legal Ethics, Morality, and Religion, Fordham
University School of Law. I presented earlier versions of this essay at the Fordham Law
School Symposium The Internal Point of View in Law and Ethics, at a George Washington
Law School Faculty Workshop, and as the Louis D. Brandeis Lecture at Pepperdine Law
School. I would like to thank all who attended these presentations for their helpful
comments. I would also like to thank Bruce Green, Gene Harper, Sam Levine, Andy
Perlman, Ed Purcell, Becky Roiphe, Amy Uelmen, and Rob Vischer for their wise insights.
1. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis et al., The Patterns and Implications of Political
Contributions by Elite Law School Faculty, 93 Geo. L.J. 1167 (2005); Editorial, The ABA 's
Liberal Agenda, Tampa Trib., Aug. 12, 2001, at cmt., p. 2; John R. Lott, Jr., Pulling Rank,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 2006, at A21; Robert F. Nagel, The Problem with The Court: Well, the
Justices, Being Lawyers, Think Like Them, Nat'l Rev., Nov. 21, 2005, at 43; Hans Bader,
Why Stop with Non-Judges?, Competitive Enter. Inst., July 18, 2005,
http://www.cei.org/gencon/019,04690.cfm.
2. See, e.g., Joshua Rozenberg, Why the White House Wants to Judge Judges: Back in
Office with Scores to Settle, The Republicans Are Determined that "Left-Leaning Liberals"
at the American Bar Will No Longer Hinder Judicial Appointments, Daily Telegraph
(London), Mar. 27, 2001, at 17; Bader, supra note 1.
3. See, e.g., William C. Duncan, "A Lawyer Class": Views on Marriage and "Sexual
Orientation" in the Legal Profession, 15 B.Y.U. J. Pub. L. 137 (2001); Justin Katz, An
Invidious Prohibition, Building Bias into the Judiciary, Nat'l Rev. Online, Oct. 4, 2004,
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/katz200410040858.asp; Lott, supra note 1;
Editorial, supra note 1.
4. Kenneth R. Bazinet, Bush On Defensive: Sez Nominee 'Best Person I Could Find,'
N.Y. Daily News, Oct. 5, 2005, at 23 (quoting David Frum). For similar observations
regarding the leftward drift of the legal system, see, for example, Bader, supra note I
("Judges typically drift to the left after being appointed to a high-profile post."); Nagel,
supra note 1 (discussing the contention that conservative judges "are subjected to intense
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affiliated with religious conservatives to .create lawyers free of the
politically liberal taint. 5
I would like to suggest that this affinity between the legal profession and
a Blue State, which often manifests itself in differences on substantive
issues of policy and law, has its roots in conceptions of public philosophy,6
jurisprudence, and legal ethics. In particular, I would like to focus on the
way that people who express a priority for moral values are far more likely
to be part of Red State America. 7 Although this distinction undoubtedly
glosses over some nuances, such as the Republican allegiance of economic
libertarians 8 and the strong values commitments of religious liberals9 and
secular humanists, '0 it does offer a reasonably accurate description of what
Michael Barone has described as "two Americas ... of different faiths.""
Indeed, as a general matter, Blue State voters are less friendly to the
pressure to undergo radical ideological changes," much of it from "read[ing] the Washington
Post [and] socializ[ing] with liberal law professors").
5. Francis M. Lazarus, Genesis of a Conference, 78 Marq. L. Rev. 397 (1995); Jane
Lampman, Bringing the Case Against Judges, Christian Sci. Monitor, Apr. 13, 2005, at 15;
Adam Liptak, Giving the Law a Religious Perspective: Falwell's School Says Its Mission Is
to Train "Ministers of Justice," N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 2004, at Al 6; Emma Schwartz,
Falwell 's School Joins Others in Teaching Law to Their Flocks: The Legal Program at the
Reverend's University Represents the Latest Effort by the Religious Right to Change
American Society, L.A. Times, Nov. 21, 2004, at A24.
6. I use this term in the same way Michael Sandel employs it to indicate philosophical
approaches that "blur the line between political commentary and political philosophy."
Michael J. Sandel, Public Philosophy: Essays on Morality in Politics 5 (2005). The goal of
this essay is to identify the outlines of the dominant political philosophies that have provided
the foundation, at least in broad strokes, of prevailing political perspectives.
7. See David Brooks, One Nation, Slightly Divisible, Atlantic Monthly, Dec. 2001, at
53; William Safire, Battleground: Those "Swing States " Neither Red nor Blue, N.Y. Times,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 32; Katharine Q. Seelye, Moral Values Cited as a Defining Issue of the
Election, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 2004, at P4; see also Michael Barone, The 49 Percent Nation,
Nat'l J., June 9, 2001, at 1710, 1716. When using the terms Red State and Blue State, the
essay refers to the contrasting approach to moral values and not to any particular geographic
area. The title of the essay refers to the legal profession as an institution that supports Blue
State values.
8. See, e.g., William Safire, Inside a Republican Brain, N.Y. Times, July 21, 2004, at
AI9; Randy E. Barnett, Keeping Libertarians Inside the Tent, Nat'l Rev. Online, Nov. 22,
2002, http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-bamettl 12202.asp; Patrick Hynes,
Hurting the Ones You (Ought to) Love, Am. Spectator Online, June 27, 2006,
http://www.spectator.org/dsp-article.asp?artid=10013.
9. See, e.g., Caryle Murphy & Alan Cooperman, Religious Liberals Gain New
Visibility: A Different List of Moral Issues, Wash. Post, May 20, 2006, at A1; Red and Blue
Religion? Faith Leads the Devout to Different Sides of Political Divide, Dallas Morning
News, Sept. 1, 2004, at 23A (interview with Joseph Hough and Gary Bauer); Religious
Action Center of Reform Judaism, The First Session of the 107th Congress: The Legislative
Agenda of the Religious Action Ctr. (Mar. 2001),
http://rac.org/advocacy/reviewagenda/agenda 107-1/.
10. See, e.g., Am. Humanist Ass'n, Humanism and Its Aspirations (2003); Caroline Hsu,
Rallying the Humanists, U.S. News & World Rep., Aug. 8, 2005, at 46.
11. Barone, supra note 7, at 1716; see also Brooks, supra note 7; Thomas L. Friedman,
Two Nations Under God, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 2004, at A25; Seelye, supra note 7.
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promotion of moral values through the public sphere.12 In contrast to Red
State voters, they are more likely to embrace a liberal public philosophy
that emphasizes a conception of individual freedom grounded in the "basic
principle of human dignity, [that] no person or group has the right
deliberately to impose personal ethical values ... on anyone else."' 13
The dominant-although not exclusive-modem conception of the
lawyer as a hired gun tracks this commitment to removing personal ethical
values from politics. It asserts that the proper functioning of the legal
system requires lawyers to remove personal ethical values from their
work. 14 Their role is to function as extreme partisans without moral
accountability for their own conduct or even that of their clients so long as
both have not definitively crossed the bounds of the law.15 In this role, they
are to be morally neutral. As Sanford Levinson has observed, the dominant
conception requires .'bleaching' out of [the] merely contingent aspects of
the self, including the residue of particularistic socialization that we refer to
as our 'conscience. ' 16
A powerful illustration of the confluence between the conception of the
lawyer's role and the Blue State approach to values is a recent decision of
12. Barone, supra note 7, at 1716. As Michael Sandel has observed, "The Democrats
have ceded to Republicans a monopoly on the moral and spiritual sources of American
politics." Friedman, supra note 11 (quoting Sandel); see also Brooks, supra note 7. But see
Gary Langer, A Question of Values, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 2004, at A19; Dick Meyer, The
Anatomy of a Myth, Wash. Post, Dec. 5, 2004, at BI.
13. Ronald Dworkin, Who Should Shape Our Culture?, L. Sch., Autumn 2005, at 20, 2 1;
see also Sandel, supra note 6, at 149 (noting that liberals assert that "the state should not
impose on its citizens a preferred way of life, but should leave them as free as possible to
choose their own values and ends, consistent with a similar liberty for others"); Barone,
supra note 7, at 1716. Interestingly, some critics-often liberals-argue that liberals do
indeed have values and that the Red State/Blue State distinction based on the polling
question regarding values is the result only of a "poorly devised" question. See, e.g., Langer,
supra note 12. In fact, this critique only underscores the accuracy of the distinction. As
conservative commentators have pointed out-and more liberal commentators have recently
acknowledged-political liberals do possess strongly held values. See infra note 183-86 and
accompanying text. But what the polling question revealed is important data about how
Blue State voters generally think. They view their own policy prescriptions as neutral with
regard to values at the same time that they believe that politically conservative perspectives
wrongly impose values on the public sphere in ways that are intolerant and impermissibly
limit individual freedom.
14. See, e.g., Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A
Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 613, 622; William H. Simon,
The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wisc. L. Rev.
29, 36; Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting Professional Identity, 74 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 7
(2003); see also Russell G. Pearce & Amelia J. Uelmen, Religious Lawyering in a Liberal
Democracy: A Challenge and an Invitation, 55 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 127, 142-45 (2004).
15. David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study 20 (1988); Murray L.
Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 Cal. L. Rev. 669, 671
(1978).
16. Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the Construction
of Professional Identity, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1577, 1578 (1993); see also Pearce & Uelmen,
supra note 14, at 142-45.
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the Tennessee Supreme Court's Board of Professional Responsibility. 17 A
Catholic lawyer who believed that abortion was murder sought to avoid a
court appointment to represent a teenage girl seeking court permission to
obtain an abortion without her parents' consent or, in the alternative, to
recommend to his client that it would be better for her to seek parental
consent and explore alternatives to abortion. 18  Even though a literal
reading of the applicable rules would appear to have permitted, though not
endorsed, either course of action, the Board found that if the lawyer were to
make a recommendation to his client based upon his personal beliefs, or
even if he were to withdraw representation, his conduct would improperly
create the risk of imposing his values upon the client or upon the legal
system.' 9 Even in the Red State of Tennessee, the legal profession felt
bound to follow a Blue State approach to values.
This approach to values was not always the dominant approach of the
legal profession. Indeed, until the 1960s, the leading American conception
of the lawyer's role required lawyers to bring their conception of the public
good into their work as lawyers. 20 In 1984, Chief Justice Warren Burger
complained that lawyers had forsaken their obligation to place the public
good above their self interest and declared a "crisis of professionalism." 2 1
Since that time, leaders of the bench, bar, and academy have sought
unsuccessfully to revive that duty. 22
One source of this failure has been a mistaken understanding of the
development and decline of lawyers' commitment to the public good.
Many bar leaders and academics persist in repeating a version of the
account that bar leaders first presented in the late nineteenth century as part
of the justification for the creation and empowerment of bar associations. 23
17. Bd. of Prof I Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tenn., Formal Ethics Op. 96-F-
140 (June 13, 1996), available at
http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/OPINIONS/Ethics/BdofProResp/_PDFFiles/92-99/96-f- 140.pdf.
18. Id. at 2-3.
19. Id. at 2-5; see also Teresa Stanton Collett, Professional Versus Moral Duty:
Accepting Appointments in Unjust Civil Cases, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 635, 642-43 (1997);
Martha Minow, On Being a Religious Professional: The Religious Turn in Professional
Ethics, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 661, 681-82 (2001); Pearce & Uelmen, supra note 14, at 143-45.
20. Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America's Governing Class: The Formation and
Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer's Role, 8 U. Chi.
Roundtable 381 (2001).
21. Warren E. Burger, The State of Justice, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1984, at 62; see also Pearce,
supra note 20, at 410-11.
22. See, e.g., Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself" A Review of Empirical Research on
Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 Am. U. L. Rev. 1337, 1347 (1997);
Eugene R. Gaetke, Renewed Introspection and the Legal Profession, 87 Ky. L.J. 903, 909-10
(1999); Samuel J. Levine, Faith in Legal Professionalism: Believers and Heretics, 61 Md.
L. Rev. 217 (2002); Pearce & Uelmen, supra note 14, at 148-49; Deborah L. Rhode, Law,
Lawyers, and the Pursuit of Justice, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 1543, 1556 (2002).
23. See, e.g., Robert Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s
to the 1980s, at 93 (1983) (noting that bar leaders "accepted as axiomatic that bar standards
had declined between 1840 and 1870"); Charles Warren, A History of the American Bar
(1911).
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With some variations in the chronological periods covered and explanations
emphasized, the story they tell is as follows. The pre-Revolutionary
American bar continued the English traditions of a self-regulating guild and
the noblesse oblige responsibility of the gentleman. Sometime during the
early nineteenth century, the bar began to decline as it became easy to
become a lawyer and the sense of public responsibility collapsed. The
creation of bar organizations after the Civil War revived standards for
admission and ethics, including renewal of the public responsibility, and
this success continued through the start of the crisis of professionalism. 24
All that needs to be done to end the crisis is to teach professionalism to
lawyers. 25
As this essay describes, the dominant story begins with assumptions that
leading historians have rejected for at least 40 years. Beginning with Perry
Miller,26 and continuing through the tremendously influential work of
Gordon Wood,27 these historians have identified the period following the
Revolution as the moment of creation of a uniquely American
understanding of lawyers as a necessary governing class in a democracy. 28
24. The classic statement of the history is Roscoe Pound's observation that "[t]he high
point [of the American bar] at the beginning is on the eve of the Revolution. The lowest
point is immediately after the Civil War." Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer From Antiquity to
Modem Times 223 (1953). Elements of this story are found in the mythology of the bar.
See, e.g., Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap,
Legal Education and Professional Development-an Educational Continuum 103-20 (1992)
[hereinafter MacCrate Report]. Elements are also found in the work of distinguished
scholars. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, American Lawyers 40-48 (1989); Lawrence M.
Friedman, A History of American Law 226-49, 463-500 (3d ed. 2005). Instead of examining
the dominant understandings of lawyers and judges, these commentators use the rigor of
standards for admission as the determinant of how well the bar was fulfilling its public role.
25. See, e.g., MacCrate Report, supra note 24.
26. Perry Miller, The Life of the Mind in America from the Revolution to the Civil War
(1965).
27. Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787, at 403-09
(1969) [hereinafter Wood, Creation]; Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American
Revolution 104-07, 253-55, 346 (1991) [hereinafter Wood, Radicalism]; see, e.g., William
Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 455, 462 (2005)
(describing Gordon Wood as "the leading historian of the framing"). But while Gordon
Wood's analysis has dominated the approach of historians to this era, not all agree with him.
See, e.g., Christopher Flannery, Tender of the Flame, Am. Scholar, Spring 1997, at 310, 311
(reviewing Lance Banning, The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison and the Founding of
the Federal Republic (1995)) (describing Wood as having "established the leading historical
paradigm for founding studies for the past thirty years" but criticizing his work).
28. Miller, supra note 26, at 99-206; Wood, Radicalism, supra note 27, at 254, 323. In
the legal literature, see Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 1,
14 (1988) and Pearce, supra note 20, at 384-92, especially 387 n.53. Although his earlier
work rejects a strong antebellum connection between lawyers and the public good, see
Norman W. Spaulding, The Myth of Civic Republicanism: Interrogating the Ideology of
Antebellum Legal Ethics, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 1397 (2003) [hereinafter Spaulding, Myth of
Civic Republicanism]. Norman Spaulding's more recent work at least rejects the standard
bar notion that the antebellum connection was largely nonexistent. Norman W. Spaulding,
The Discourse of Law in Time of War: Politics and Professionalism During the Civil War
and Reconstruction, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2001, 2029-39 (2005) [hereinafter Spaulding,
Discourse of Law].
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From this vantage, the post-Civil War period, rather than serving as the
high point of lawyers' commitment to the public good, actually began a
period of narrowing conceptions of the capacity of lawyers and the nature
of the public good that continued through the 1960s. 29 When the final
collapse of lawyers' commitment to the public good occurred in the 1960s,
it represented the victory of a view that rejects the idea that any conception
of the public good is necessarily superior to another, much like the
understandings that are dominant among Blue State voters. 30  Not
surprisingly, lawyers with these views are largely immune to efforts to
preach professionalism. 3 1
In this essay, I extend my previous work on the origins of the "governing
class" perspective and its demise in the 1960s.32 The essay incorporates
jurisprudence and public political philosophy into the analysis and offers a
more nuanced account that explains the gradual erosion of the commitment
to the public good that preceded its collapse. In addition to offering a more
complex historical account, the essay also concludes by suggesting the
framework for a normative obligation of lawyers to the public good
grounded not in the mythology of an idealized past 33 but in the reality of
contemporary moral challenges.
A few caveats are also in order. First, the essay is written from the
perspective that ideas matter and that they shape how we understand our
place in the world. It rejects the view that our actions are determined
exclusively by material self-interest. Second, the essay does not provide a
complete account of the history of public political philosophy,
jurisprudence, or legal ethics. It follows dominant trends and changes in
"emphasis and proportion." 34 It does not explore the many gradual and
fluctuating changes that comprise these trends and does not offer a full
account of the variety of nuances within either dominant or minority
perspectives. Third, the essay examines how lawyers understand their
work, not how they actually perform it.35  To construct lawyers'
understanding of the place of the public good in their representation of
clients, the essay looks to ethics rules and treatises, as well as the published
29. See infra Part II.
30. See infra Part III.
31. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Pearce, supra note 20; Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm
Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of
the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1229 (1995) [hereinafter Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm
Shift]; Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 241 (1992) [hereinafter Pearce, Republican Origins].
33. As Brian Tamanaha observes, these romantic jurisprudential perspectives "invoked
abstractions and offered accounts of law and judging that, in hindsight, appear patently
implausible. Nonetheless, they were widely espoused and sincerely believed, especially by
the legal elite." Brian Z. Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law 4
(2006). Tamanaha's work parallels this essay. In describing the shift to an "instrumental
view of the law," he focuses on a different aspect within the same general trends. Id.
34. Id. at 2.
35. Id. at 4.
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pronouncements of lawyers. Beyond that, it is impossible as a historical
matter to compare the actual conversations between lawyer and client over
time. With its main focus on how lawyers understand their relationship to
the public good, the essay also does not determine whether lawyers actually
fulfilled their aspirations to the public good or whether their views of the
public good are the same as ours today. Certainly, they are not. While
lawyers throughout American history may share general commitments to
the rule of law and individual rights, today's understandings of the public
good-disputed as they are-would converge in rejecting notions of the
superiority of whites, of Protestants, and of men that were widespread
among bar leaders from the late nineteenth through the twentieth
centuries.36 Nonetheless, as with the aspirations in our Declaration of
Independence and Constitution, the fact that the public good was
historically associated with tarnished ideas does not mean we should
abandon it altogether.37 To do so would mean losing a valuable and
necessary resource for understanding the role and responsibilities of the
modern lawyer. 38
I. FROM GUILD TO GOVERNING CLASS
The conception that lawyers were the American governing class with the
primary responsibility for the public good emerged in the constitutional
period. It borrowed from the English guild notion that lawyers were above
self-interest, but claimed a far more ambitious societal role for lawyers than
the English guild conception recognized. The American construct reflected
the demands of an elite political philosophy that embraced majority rule but
36. See, e.g., Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in
Modem America 5, 25-30, 51, 100 (1976); Report of the Thirty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the
American Bar Association 12-16 (1912) (resolution stating that "it has never been
contemplated that members of the colored race should become members of this
Association"); Tamanaha, supra note 33, at 35; Samuel J. Levine, Rediscovering Julius
Henry Cohen and the Origins of the Business/Profession Dichotomy: A Study in the
Discourse of Early Twentieth Century Legalism, 47 Am. J. Legal Hist. 1, 3-16 (2005);
Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1163, 1167-73
(1988); David B. Wilkins, A Systematic Response to Systemic Disadvantage: A Response to
Sander, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1915, 1920-23 (2005).
37. Martin Luther King, Jr., for example, relied on the general commitment of the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution to human dignity and equality to argue
that their spirit supported equal rights for African Americans even though the documents
themselves were written, in part, by slaveholders and did not abrogate-but actually
permitted-slavery. Martin Luther King, Jr., "I Have A Dream," Address Delivered at the
March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom 1 (Aug. 28, 1963), available at
http://www.stanford.edu/group/King/publications/speeches/address at march-onwashingto
n.pdf (transcript) ("When the architects of our republic wrote the magnificent words of the
Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, they were signing a promissory note to
which every American was to fall heir."); see also Gordon S. Wood, Revolutionary
Characters: What Made the Founders Different 8-11 (2006) (defending the "greatness" of
the founders even though they "do not share our modem views about important matters,
about race, the role of woman, and equality").
38. For a similar argument regarding a noninstrumental approach to the law, see
Tamanaha, supra note 33, at 250.
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found it incompatible with the public good and rule of law absent a
governing class to manage it.
A. The English Guild
In colonial America, the legal profession largely borrowed from the
English guild model. Society trusted guilds to rise above self-interest and
to police themselves. In turn, the government permitted the guilds
autonomy in membership, production, and marketing. 39 Although English
craft guilds had largely lost their authority by the eighteenth century,40 the
guild continued to provide the organizational basis for the professions. In
the legal profession, this meant that lawyers would perform their
obligations to the legal system with excellence and integrity. 41
But English lawyers were not the governing class. 42 Their commitment
was to what H.L.A. Hart termed an "internal point of view," faithfulness to
the secondary rules that society maintained for resolving disputes, not to
maintaining the public good.43 Although lawyers came from the social
class of "gentlemen," possessed of "good behavior, well bred, amiable,
[and] high-minded, '44 the task of governing fell to aristocrats and their
oldest sons who assumed their place, not their younger sons who might
become lawyers.45  Accordingly, although Blackstone's natural lawjurisprudence included an expansive commitment to the public good that
lawyers would have to understand, the primary responsibility for
identifying and pursuing the good for society fell to the gentry and not to
the community of lawyers. As Perry Miller observed, "Blackstone tailored
his masterpiece to the needs on an eighteenth-century England, wherein the
gentry still ruled as justices of the peace, with the House of Commons as
their club."4 6
B. The Original American Understanding
The development of a uniquely American ethic for lawyers began around
the time of the Constitution's ratification. The republican ideology of the
American Revolution viewed society as organic. 47 Although "commerce
and the attendant pursuit of self interest [posed] a threat to proper
39. Elliot A. Krause, Death of the Guilds: Professions, States, and the Advance of
Capitalism, 1930 to the Present 2-6 (1996).
40. Id. at 7.
41. See, e.g., Samuel Haber, The Quest for Authority and Honor in the American
Professions, 1750-1900, at 74-78 (1991).
42. See, e.g., id. at 67; Robert Robson, The Attorney in Eighteenth-Century England 82-
83 (Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc. 1986) (1959); Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in
America 268 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1835).
43. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 88-91, 116-17 (2d ed. 1994).
44. Wood, supra note 37, at 14.
45. See, e.g., Wilfrid R. Prest, The Rise of the Barristers: A Social History of the
English Bar 1590-1640, at 87 (1986); Tocqueville, supra note 42, at 268.
46. Miller, supra note 26, at 144; see also Tocqueville, supra note 42, at 267-68.
47. Miller, supra note 26, at 144.
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governance and to virtue," 48 the deliberative process would enable "the
people... to perceive the common good and to define the limits of
individual rights."49  Majority rule would provide the "voice of the
people"50 that would establish a government responsible for "fostering
virtue, of making the individual unselfishly devote himself to the common
good."51
The experience of republican government after the American Revolution
shattered the elite's faith in the ability of individuals and majorities to
overcome their selfish interests. "[P]rivate interest," they concluded, "ruled
most social relationships," and the expectation that "most people [would]
sacrifice their private interests for the sake of the public good was
utopian. ' 52 Observing that legislatures disregarded property and individual
rights in expropriating land and in making biased or corrupt decisions, the
elite no longer believed that deliberative democracy would result in
virtuous government for the benefit of the public good.53 Instead, they
came to fear that unchecked majority rule would result in tyranny of the
majority. 54
They turned instead to a public political philosophy that combined both
liberal and republican impulses. Retaining the republican goal of
government as promoting the public good, they tended to define that good
in liberal terns, such as "security, justice, prosperity and liberty. '55 At the
same time, they maintained the republican distrust of commerce and of self-
interested factions.56 They embraced checks and balances as a roadblock to
tyranny of the majority and concluded that majority rule would only
coincide with the public good, including rule of law and protection of
minority rights, so long as an elite governing class provided leadership to
the majority. 57 In the view of the framers, professionals, as the sector of
society that pursued the public good and not self-interest, were best suited
to this role. 58
Antebellum jurisprudence assigned this vital governing class role to
lawyers on account of their virtue and their central role in governance.
48. Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 32, at 251.
49. William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 Yale L.J. 694, 701 (1985).
50. Id.; see also Wood, Creation, supra note 27, at 134.
51. Treanor, supra note 49, at 699; see also Wood, Creation, supra note 27, at 60-68,
162-65; Wood, Radicalism, supra note 27, at 104-06, 188-89; Treanor, supra note 27.
52. Wood, Radicalism, supra note 27, at 252-53.
53. Wood, Creation, supra note 27, at 403-09; William Michael Treanor, Taking the
Framers Seriously, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1016, 1033 (1988).
54. Wood, Creation, supra note 27, at 403-09; Treanor, supra note 53, at 1033.
55. Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism
179 (1990).
56. Wood, Radicalism, supra note 27, at 253-54.
57 Id. at 253-58; see also Nedelsky, supra note 55, at 170-83; Pearce, supra note 20, at
386.
58. The Federalist No. 35, at 257 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961); see also Wood, Radicalism, supra note 27, at 253-58; Pearce, supra note 20, at 386.
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Virtue inhered in lawyers both in their status as professionals and in the
nature of legal practice. 59 Americans transformed the English notion of
lawyers as gentlemen by class into a conception of lawyers as gentlemen as
a moral badge of their ability to rise above self-interest, whatever their class
origin.60 Ensuring lawyers' virtue was the practical wisdom necessary to
succeed in their work of representing clients.61 This work required an
ability to master both natural law and empirical knowledge. As Joseph
Story wrote, "'The Law of Nature[]... lies at the foundation of all other
laws, and constitutes the first step in the science of jurisprudence."' 62
Nonetheless, the appropriate methodology for applying this science to a
particular case was "instrumental and pragmatic," 63 grounded ultimately in
"experience" 64 that reflected "social context,"65 and not "jurisprudential
theory" 66  alone. Story viewed the common law as "'constantly
expanding... with the exigencies of society,"' such as its "commercial
needs." 67
59. See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
60. Wood, supra note 37, at 14-16. This transformation helps explain the contrast
between the English preference for the landed gentry to assume political leadership, see
supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text, with the American preference for professionals,
see The Federalist No. 35, supra note 58 (identifying professionals as preferred political
leadership though finding the landed gentry superior to merchants).
61. 1 David Hoffman, A Course of Legal Study, Addressed to Students and the
Profession Generally 26-27 (2d ed. Baltimore, Joseph Neal 1836) (observing that "[t]o be
great in the law... it is essential that we should be great in every virtue; skilled in many,
and somewhat improved in most of the departments of knowledge, for 'it applies the greatest
powers of the understanding to the greatest number of facts,' and embraces nearly the entire
extent of human actions and concerns").
62. Stephen M. Feldman, From Premodern to Modern American Jurisprudence: The
Onset of Positivism, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 1387, 1414 (1997) (omission in original) (quoting
Justice Joseph Story).
63. Id. at 1411.
64. Id. at 1401.
65. Id. at 1398.
66. Id. at 1404.
67. Id. at 1415 (quoting Justice Story in part). Morton Horwitz uses Story's concern
with "commercial needs" as evidence that the antebellum jurisprudence "reshaped ["the
legal system"] to the advantage of men of commerce and industry at the expense of farmers,
workers, consumers, and other less powerful groups within the society." Morton U. Horwitz,
The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, at 253-54 (1977); see also Edward A.
Purcell, Jr., The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism & the Problem of Value
(1973). Even assuming that Horwitz is correct both with regard to the instrumental approach
and the negative impact of that approach on society, the subject of this essay is how Story
and other jurisprudential thinkers of the time understood the nexus between lawyers and the
public good, not whether they in fact were promoting the public good. As Brian Tamanaha
points out, Story and his peers uniformly described themselves as applying natural law in a
noninstrumental way. Tamanaha, supra note 33, at 24-28, 33-35. This essay also follows
Stephen Feldman's approach in identifying antebellum jurisprudence as containing both
natural law and empirical elements. See Feldman, supra note 62, at 1404-05 (seeking to
"reconcile" commentators, such as William LaPiana and G. Edward White, who emphasize
the primacy of natural law analysis with commentators, such as Robert Gordon, Morton
Horwitz, Karl Llewellyn, and Grant Gilmore, who emphasize the primacy of pragmatic
considerations).
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As the custodians of the formal and informal institutions of governance,
lawyers applied their ability to identify and promote the public good to
providing the leadership necessary to ensure that laws would be consistent
with the public good and that the majority would respect the rule of law.68
Within the formal government, lawyers "controlled the judicial branch and
dominated the legislature and the executive. ' 69 Equally important, as
representatives of clients and as members of the community, they also
served as intermediaries between the formal institutions of government and
the people. In "counsel[ing] clients, making arguments in court to judge[s]
and jur[ies]," and participating in civic life, they "sought to gain the
confidence of and 'to diffuse sound principles among the people."' 70
The governing class conception embraced a necessary connection
between lawyers' ethics and the public good. Commentators agreed that
legal ethics required moral counseling, moral considerations in deciding
who to represent, respect for court and colleagues, and personal integrity. 71
Beyond these axioms, the two leading American ethicists disagreed on how
to reconcile republican and adversarial obligations. David Hoffman urged
lawyers not to pursue a defense or claim that they believed "cannot, or
rather ought not, to be sustained," 72 including the Statute of Limitations
when based on the "mere efflux of time. '73 In a criminal case "of the
deepest dye," where the lawyer believed the client guilty, Hoffman argued
that it would be unprofessional to apply "ingenuity ... beyond securing to
them a fair and dispassionate investigation of the facts of their cause."'74 In
contrast, George Sharswood urged lawyers to zealously put the prosecution
to its proof in order to protect the defendant's liberty interests, even where
the crime was heinous. 75 In civil matters too, Sharswood, in contrast to
Hoffman, believed that liberty and property rights of defendants required
lawyers to defend an "unrighteous claim." 76  Nonetheless, Sharswood
limited advocacy of that claim "to assuring the defendant 'a fair trial"' and
advised lawyers to refrain from assisting a client in "frustrat[ing] legitimate
property rights, such as... the 'just demands of creditors."' 77
68. Pearce, supra note 20, at 387-92.
69. Id. at 387; see also Friedman, supra note 24, at 110; Hon. George Sharswood, An
Essay on Professional Ethics 25, 30-31 (5th ed., Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1993) (1896).
70. Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 32, at 256; see also Sharswood, supra note
69, at 30-31, 53-54.
71. Pearce, supra note 20, at 388-91; Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 32, at 258-
66.
72. David Hoffman, Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment, in 2 Hoffman,
supra note 61, at 752, 754 (Resolution XI).
73. Id. (Resolution XII) (emphasis omitted).
-J-4. Id. at 755-56 (Resolution XV) (emphasis omitted).
75. Pearce, Republican OIgins,-supra'note 32, at 265-66, 265 n.193 (citing Sharswood,
supra note 69).
76. Sharswood, supra note 69, at 98; see also id. at 95-99; Pearce, Republican Origins,
supra note 32, at 265-66 (explaining the civil context).
77. Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 32, at 266 (quoting Sharswood, supra note
69, at 98-99, 112).
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The commitment to the public good in legal ethics, grounded in
jurisprudence and public political philosophy, withstood pressures from
both inside and outside the legal profession. Throughout the antebellum
period, some argued that lawyers were business people.78 Still others
argued for a hired gun perspective. 79 They endorsed Lord Brougham's
well-known maxim that "'an advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows
but one person in all the world, and that person is his client.' 80 Hoffman
and Sharswood expressly rejected these approaches. 81
During the Jacksonian era, prevailing public sentiment rejected the
notion that lawyers, or any other elite group, had a superior ability to
identify and pursue the public good.8 2 As a result of this egalitarian
impulse, many states abolished or minimized the qualifications for
becoming a lawyer. Rather than accept these critiques, the dominant
thinkers in the bar continued to rely on the teaching of natural law
jurisprudence and elite political philosophy. Indeed, the Jacksonian era was
the time when Hoffman and Sharswood published their legal ethics treatises
articulating the governing class approach to the lawyer's role.83
78. Maxwell Bloomfield, American Lawyers in a Changing Society, 1776-1876, at 150-
51 (1976); Wood, Radicalism, supra note 27, at 284.
79. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 26, at 100-04, 187, 203-06. Norman Spaulding has
argued that the "civic republican" conception of lawyering and a "client-centered" approach
were dominant in the antebellum period. See Spaulding, Myth of Civic Republicanism, supra
note 28, at 1399-1400. By creating a straw man of "civic republicanism" grounded in
modem arguments for moral activism, he mistakenly classifies perspectives, such as
Sharswood's, that integrate advocacy with a strong commitment to the public good as
exclusively client centered and he fails to recognize that commentators he describes as client
centered expressly reject the amoral perspective of the hired gun. Id. at 1442-43. Spaulding
describes as a defender of "client-centered, ethically neutral lawyering," id. at 1440, a
commentator who asserted, "'[Clients] have purchased your services, but not your
consciences. You are not responsible for the goodness of their cause; but you are
responsible for the means you use to gain it."' Id. at 1442 (quoting T. Walker, Advice to Law
Students: Being the Substance of a Valedictory Address to the Graduates of the Law Class
in the Cincinnatti College, Delivered March 3, 1838, 1 W. L.J. 481, 483 (1844)). Perhaps
one of the grounds for these erroneous readings is his attempt to place the antebellum
conception of republican lawyering in the context of the "civic republicanism" of the
Revolution and of contemporary discourse, rather than the more complex liberal
republicanism that was dominant among the elites in the antebellum period. See supra notes
54-57 and accompanying text. Interestingly, Spaulding's later work acknowledges the
power of obligations to the public good in the antebellum period, though he does so by
reading the late nineteenth century conception of professionalism into the earlier period.
Spaulding, Discourse of Law, supra note 28, at 2029-39.
80. David Mellinkoff, The Conscience of a Lawyer 189 (1973) (quoting Brougham).
For a recent debate regarding Henry Lord Brougham, compare Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce
A. Green, "Anything Rather Than A Deliberate and Well-Considered Opinion "--Henry
Lord Brougham, Written By Himself, 19 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1221 (2006), with Monroe H.
Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham, Written by Himself, 19 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1213 (2006).
81. See Maxwell Bloomfield, David Hoffman and the Shaping of a Republican Legal
Culture, 38 Md. L. Rev. 673, 684 (1979); see also Sharswood, supra note 69, at 84-97;
Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 32, at 257-58.
82. See Bloomfield, supra note 78, at 84; see, e.g., Friedman, supra note 24, at 236-37.
83. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text; see also Spaulding, Discourse of
Law, supra note 28, at 2029-39 (discussing professionalism in the Jacksonian era).
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II. REDEFINING AND LIMITING THE DUTY TO THE PUBLIC GOOD
In the period from the Civil War through the 1960s, the duty of lawyers
to the public good narrowed both in terms of defining the public good and
in terms of lawyers' capacity for pursuing the good. Promoting this
redefinition was the shift in the dominant jurisprudence from natural law to
empiricism, a shift that reflected the increasing influence of liberalism in
the larger society.
A. The Decline of the Public Good in Elite Public Political Philosophy
After the Civil War, the increasing influence of liberalism undermined
the republican faith in an organic community that promoted the public
good. 84 While liberalism encompassed a variety of particular political
prescriptions, its fundamental emphasis was promoting freedom of the
individual.8 5  At its core, liberalism conceived of the individual as
fundamentally self-interested and viewed the role of government as
permitting individuals the greatest freedom possible.8 6 When individuals
maximized freedom, they would also maximize what was best for society
through the invisible hand of the market 87 or through the democratic
electoral process. 88 As a political philosophy, liberalism did not, at its core,
include a conception of the public good independent of individual
freedom. 89
This absence permitted the development of hybrid public political
philosophies that combined liberalism with conceptions of the public good
that were not apparently inconsistent with the logic of liberalism. Prior to
liberalism, dominant philosophies tended to view society as having an
organic component that was more than the compilation of individual self-
interest and as having a goal of promoting the public good.90 As liberalism
advanced, some public political philosophies sought to accommodate the
reality of individual self-interest that liberalism identified with the goal of
84. For republicanism, see supra text accompanying notes 47-51.
85. See, e.g., John Gray, Liberalism, at ix-xi, 26-36, 82 (1986); Stephen Macedo, Liberal
Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community in Liberal Constitutionalism 9 (1990); Michael
J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy 4-7 (1996);
Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society 181 (rev. ed. 1983).
86. See, e.g., Gray, supra note 85, at ix-xi, 82; Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 23-
24 (1995).
87. See, e.g., Gray, supra note 85, at 62-72; Posner, supra note 86, at 24-25.
88. See, e.g., Sandel, supra note 85, at 5. Majority rule offers a method for aggregating
individual preferences. Id. Although many liberal theorists emphasize that democracy may
in fact undermine individual freedom, Posner, supra note 86, at 25-29; Gray, supra note 85,
at 73-78, the emerging preference for deference to majority rule reflected that it was-at
least implicitly-becoming a higher good than limited government. See infra notes 97-99
and accompanying text.
89. Alasdair Maclntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 334-38 (1988); Sandel,
supra note 85, at 7-8.
90. See, e.g., Gray, supra note 85, at 7-25, 45-56. For a discussion of civic
republicanism, see supra note 79.
20061 1351
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
promoting the public good.9 1 For example, as discussed above, liberal
republicanism in the antebellum period derived a conception of the good
from natural law that included the liberal commitment to individual
freedom, a conception of justice that transcended individual self-interest,
and an elite governing class that placed the public good above self-
interest.92
Nonetheless, the logic of liberalism made individual freedom primary.
As liberalism extended its influence, hybrid approaches like liberal
republicanism were less persuasive. First, they were inconsistent with the
core of liberalism. The insistence on a public good independent of the
pursuit of individual self-interest prevented the maximization of individual
freedom. Second, they were unnecessary. Although liberalism may have
needed justifications grounded in natural law when it was a less powerful
force, 93 as it became dominant it no longer needed external sources of
support.
The two most significant changes in public political philosophy that
would influence the understanding of the function of lawyers related to
knowledge of truth and faith in majority rule. In the antebellum period,
access to truth required both virtue and empirical knowledge. 94 Following
the Civil War and continuing through the 1960s, empirical knowledge
became by far the more dominant way of establishing the truth, at least in
elite culture, and the influence of ethics grounded in virtue diminished
considerably. 95 Higher education, for example, shifted from a primary
emphasis on moral development of the student to a primary-and later
almost exclusive-emphasis on empirical knowledge. 96
As belief in virtue as the source of knowledge declined, the trends in
public political philosophy following the Civil War minimized or
eliminated surviving republican notions. A more liberal and democratic
sense of capacity for self-rule challenged the belief that a particular class in
society was qualified to provide elite political leadership.9 7 If an elite class
91. Sandel, supra note 85, at 4-7; see also supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text,
92. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
93. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
94. Tamanaha, supra note 33, at 63; Feldman, supra note 62, at 1400-14. For example,
in the antebellum period, a scientific approach consisted of knowledge acquired through both
virtue and empiricism. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 26, at 158-59; Feldman, supra note 62, at
1400-14.
95. See, e.g., Michal Alberstein, Pragmatism and Law: From Philosophy to Dispute
Resolution 21 (2002) (noting that, from the late nineteenth century, "anything not
scientifically constructed, logical, argumentative, or structured will be considered outside the
discourse"); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40
Stan. L. Rev. 379, 380 (1988) (noting that as a result of this shift "[b]y the 1920s, nearly
every respectable scientist claimed to believe that no statement about any subject, including
humanity and society, was meaningful unless it could be empirically proven or disproven").
96. See, e.g., George M. Marsden, The Soul of the American University: From
Protestant Establishment to Established Nonbelief (1994); Purcell, supra note 67, at 7-8, 15.
97. See, e.g., Macedo, supra note 85, at 97-98 (describing liberalism's rejection of elite
political leadership); Feldman, supra note 62, at 1417-19.
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was not better able to identify the truth, majority rule shifted from a source
of mistrust to grounds for celebration. Indeed, majority rule offered a way,
roughly analogous to the market, for self-interested individuals to exercise
their political freedom in a way that reconciled their preferences. 98 Where
the elite's liberal republicanism had required an elite governing class to
make democracy function properly, in the period following the Civil War
and continuing through today, the dominant understanding, even among the
elite, was that majority rule was an unqualified good and that arguments for
limiting majority rule faced a heavy burden. 99
Ironically, the increasing influence of liberalism in promoting empiricism
and belief in majority rule coincided with a declining commitment to the
vision of maximizing economic freedom through laissez-faire economics.
By the late nineteenth century, the prevailing conception of natural law
enshrined the "ideal that government should not interfere in the natural
workings of the market."' 00 Proponents rejected government regulation of
"property rights and the right to contract."101  Incorporating a strong
conception of individual self-reliance and construing contract solely as an
individual right, they condemned labor unions as interfering with natural
law and urged courts to employ natural law conceptions to strike down
legislation regulating business or empowering unions. 102 By undermining
the existence of a public good independent of self-interest and embracing
deference to majority rule, the emerging dominant liberal approach either
permitted these types of government intervention in the name of limiting
judicial discretion or encouraged them in order to pursue an empirically
justified social good.10 3
B. The Diminishing Role of Lawyers in Jurisprudence
Reflecting these shifts, jurisprudential commentators redefined the role of
lawyers in a way so as to minimize-or in some cases eliminate-their role
as the governing class. The natural law-based jurisprudence of James Kent
and Joseph Story 104 gave way to empirically grounded approaches like the
pragmatism of Oliver Wendell Holmes, the formalism of Christopher
98. See, e.g., Robert H. Wiebe, Self-Rule: A Cultural History of American Democracy
82-85 (1995).
99. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 62, at 1417-19, 1425; Treanor, supra note 27, at 464
(identifying leading commentators and judges of this period who developed arguments for
limiting judicial review).
100. Tamanaha, supra note 33, at 38; see, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 95, at 402-04.
101. Tamanaha, supra note 33, at 38; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 95, at 411-20.
102. Tamanaha, supra note 33, at 40; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 95, at 387-89.
Herbert Hovenkamp notes that the activism of the courts should not be exaggerated since
they did refuse to overturn a number of regulatory statutes. Id.
103. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Law Without Values: The Life, Work, and Legacy of
Justice Holmes 58-63, 102-03 (1997); Treanor, supra note 27, at 464.
104. Miller, supra note 26, at 166-67; Feldman, supra note 62, at 1396-1404.
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Columbus Langdell, and the sociological jurisprudence of Roscoe Pound. 105
As they rejected the natural law basis of antebellum jurisprudence, they also
rejected its suspicion of majority rule. Indeed, the empirical schools
strongly embraced majority rule.' 0 6 -
The change from natural law to empiricism as the dominant basis for
jurisprudence was not seamless. Judges who had been educated in the
natural law approach persisted in employing substantive due process to
strike down progressive legislation despite the increasing influence of
empirical jurisprudence as the dominant jurisprudence of the twentieth
century.' 0 7 Even Lon Fuller, the most influential of the twentieth century
natural law scholars, adopted a largely procedural version of natural law
that embraced majority rule in the same way as did the empirically
grounded jurisprudential commentators. 108
In these approaches to jurisprudence, lawyers were no longer central
actors. If the majority could be trusted, threats to the rule of law were the
exception and not the rule. As virtue became marginal to jurisprudence, so
did the need for lawyers as a virtuous leadership class to maintain the public
good and rule of law. As the role of lawyers diminished, or disappeared
altogether, jurisprudence no longer focused on how the lawyer should
combine virtue with empirical knowledge to ascertain the law. Instead, the
dominant subject became law as "what the judges say it is."109
Lawyers played a supporting role as technicians whose task was to study
and anticipate the decisions of judges, a role that required no particular
commitment to the public good in either Langdell's formalism or Holmes's
pragmatism. 110 Pound's sociological jurisprudence nonetheless continued
to afford lawyers some important public responsibilities. While judges
played the lead role, lawyers who applied scientific methods to legal
structures could provide them with beneficial support. 11'
105. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 103, at 10 (discussing Oliver Wendell Holmes's
"revolt against natural law"); Tamanaha, supra note 33, at 61-65; Feldman, supra note 62, at
1417-46.
106. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 103, at 58-59.
107. See, e.g., Tamanaha, supra note 33, at 43-52; Hovenkamp, supra note 95, at 393-94.
Hovenkamp describes how the views of the Justices in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905), as well as the state court judges who struck down state regulations, derived from
their training in a natural law-based understanding of political economy and law "taught in
American universities in the 1870s and 1880s." Hovenkamp, supra note 95, at 400-01.
Hovenkamp also describes how, through the late nineteenth century, American legal and
economic commentators relied on a natural law approach that the English had generally
abandoned for more empirical approaches, such as utilitarianism, in the early nineteenth
century. Id. at 402-03, 415-16.
108. Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of the Law (1964).
109. Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession 196
(1993).
110. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897).
111. See generally Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 Colum. L. Rev. 605
(1908).
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These trends continued through the early 1960s. Empirical approaches to
jurisprudence, such as the legal realist, legal process, and positivist
perspectives, continued to focus on judges and to minimize the significance
of the lawyer's role." l2  Even legal process, which highlighted the
contribution of lawyers as problem solvers, limited the scope of this
function to the technical resolution of challenges facing individuals and not
the engineering of societal structures. 1' 13
Fuller's natural law jurisprudence continued to place lawyers in a
governing class role, but a far narrower one than that proposed by
antebellum thinkers. Embracing majority rule and lacking a broad
conception of lawyers' virtue, Fuller largely found the public good in the
"internal morality of the law" ' 1 4 and lawyers' roles in protecting process." 5
This was far less ambitious than the antebellum understanding that lawyers
identified and promoted the substantive, as well as the procedural, public
good and guided majority rule.' 16
C. Professionalism Both Preserves and Narrows Lawyers' Obligation to
the Public Good
With these changes in public political philosophy and jurisprudence,
lawyers had to rethink their connection to the public good. Like all
professionals, in the late nineteenth century they faced a challenge to their
status grounded in the assertion that they were just as self-interested as
business people and therefore deserving of no special authority. 117
Resentment of the privileges of professionals in general and lawyers in
particular became widespread. Robert Wiebe observed that "[w]ith the
exception of bankers, no group late in the nineteenth century stood in lower
public repute [than lawyers]."' 18
In contrast to the Jacksonian era, lawyers could no longer mobilize
jurisprudence and elite public political philosophy to justify their claim to
serving as a virtuous governing class. As a result many lawyers joined the
public in bemoaning lawyers' failure to deserve the professional status they
claimed. Robert Gordon has described "the extraordinary outpouring of
rhetoric, from all the public pulpits of the ideal-bar association and law
school commencement addresses, memorial speeches on colleagues, articles
112. See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 109, at 187-226.
113. Alberstein, supra note 95, at 167; Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal
Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law 174-80 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., Found. Press 1994) (1958).
114. See Fuller, supra note 108, at 96.
115. See Lon L. Fuller, Philosophy for the Practicing Lawyer, in The Principles of Social
Order 282, 290 (Kenneth I. Winston ed., 1981); Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall,
Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159 (1958).
116. See supra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order: 1877-1920, at 17, 116 (1967).
118. Id. at 116.
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and books--on the theme of the profession's decline from a profession to a
business." 119
In the face of this challenge, lawyers turned to the Progressive Era's
ideological embrace of professionalism. Professionalism posited "a bargain
between the profession and society."' 120  Society would permit the
profession autonomy in exchange for the promise to use its skills for the
good of its clients and the public. 121 Justifying this bargain were two
factors. One, the esoteric knowledge of lawyers made it difficult, if not
impossible, for lay people to evaluate their services and to regulate them. 122
Two, the altruism of lawyers-the fact that they worked primarily for the
public good in contrast to business people who worked for self interest-
guaranteed that society could trust lawyers to regulate themselves. 123
While continuing to find importance in lawyers' commitment to the
public good, professionalism nonetheless offered a more circumscribed
understanding both of lawyers' capacity and their societal function. Where
Hoffman and Sharswood had identified lawyers' innate virtue as the source
of their superior ability to identify and pursue the public good, 124
professionalism made the empirically grounded claim that these
characteristics derived from lawyers' training and experience.125
Professionalism also had less confidence in the commitment of the
individual lawyer. In contrast to the republican faith in the individual
lawyer and the policing power of reputation, the rhetoric of commentators
like Brandeis conceded that the standards of the profession had fallen and
sought to restore them. 126  Professionalism recognized that lawyers'
commitment to the public good could only be guaranteed through self-
regulating bar associations that controlled admission to the bar, educated
lawyers to their ethical duties, and enforced proper conduct through
discipline. 127
119. Robert Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law ": Fantasies of New York City
Lawyers, 1870-1910, in The New High Priests: Lawyers in Post-Civil War America 51, 61
(Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Richard
Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. 158 (1955); Pearce, supra note 20, at
396.
120. Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm Shift, supra note 32, at 1238.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1239; see also Burton J. Bledstein, The Culture of Professionalism: The
Middle Class and the Development of Higher Education in America 90 (1976); Rayman L.
Solomon, Five Crises or One: The Concept of Legal Professionalism, 1925-1960, in
Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers' Practices: Transformations in the American Legal Profession 146
(Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992) (citing ABA, Report of the Commission on
Professionalism 10 (1986)).
123. Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm Shift, supra note 32, at 1239-40.
124. See 1 Hoffman, supra note 61, at 26-27; Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 32,
at 259-60.
125. See Louis Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, in Business-A Profession 329,
331-335 (Hein 1996) (1914); see also Pearce, supra note 20, at 399-403.
126. Brandeis, supra note 125, at 329.
127. Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm Shift, supra note 32; Pearce, supra note 20, at
399.
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Like the conception of lawyers' capacity for the public good, the
conceptions of lawyers' function also narrowed. The antebellum notion
that lawyers were a governing class responsible for maintaining the public
good and the rule of law gave way to a perspective that defined a more
limited scope for the governing class role. Pound's view of lawyers as
"social engineers"' 128 retained the aspiration that "lawyers [should] lead the
people.., instead of giving up their legitimate hegemony in legislation and
politics to engineers and naturalists and economists." 129 But where the
antebellum view understood leadership as defining the public good for the
people, Pound viewed it as an "adjustment of the relations of men to each
other and to society as conforms to the moral sense of the community."' 130
Brandeis articulated a similar notion that retained lawyers as a governing
class charged with balancing the competing interests of rich and poor in
order to maintain a fair and stable social order. 131 At the same time that
Brandeis and Pound articulated a narrower, but still robust, conception,
Holmes appeared to abandon the governing class project altogether in
describing the entire role of lawyers as predicting legal consequences for
their clients. ' 32
While a view consistent with that of Holmes would ultimately prevail,
the bar of his time preferred the governing class vision that Brandeis and
Pound articulated. In 1908, the American Bar Association promulgated the
Canons of Ethics, the first national code of ethics for lawyers. 133 The
preamble to the Canons stated expressly that "[t]he future of the republic, to
a great extent, depend[ed] upon [lawyers'] maintenance of Justice pure and
unsullied" through "conduct and the motives [that] merit the approval of all
just men."' 134 Although the promulgation of the Canons as a formal code of
ethics reflected a lesser degree of confidence in the individual lawyer than
that of Sharswood's general guidance, the Canons themselves largely
adopted Sharswood's approach to balancing duties to clients and the
public. 135  The Canons stated that "The Lawyer's Duty in Its Last
Analysis"' 36 was "the countermajoritarian obligation of loyalty to the law
and the judicial system despite the contrary urging of any 'client, corporate
or individual, however powerful, nor any cause, civil or political, however
128. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer as a Social Engineer, 3 J. Pub. L. 292, 292
(1954).
129. Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 Green Bag 607, 612
(1907).
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Brandeis, supra note 125, at 337.
132. Holmes, supra note 110, at 458; see also Alschuler, supra note 103, at 139-40.
133. See, e.g., Haber, supra note 41, at 219 (describing Holmes's general views as
"anomalous" in his time).
134. Canons of Prof'l Ethics pmbl. (1908).
135. Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 32, at 267-72; see also James M. Altman,
Considering the A.B.A. 's 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 2395 (2003);
Bloomfield, supra note 81; Susan D. Carle, Lawyers' Duty to Do Justice: A New Look at the
History of the 1908 Canons, 24 Law & Soc. Inquiry 1 (1999).
136. Canons of Prof'l Ethics Canon 32.
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important .... "',137 At the same time, they urged "'entire devotion to the
interests of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability." ' 138 The Canons
expressly stated that this zealousness did not require the "lawyer to do
whatever may enable him to succeed in winning his client's cause." 139
Indeed, the Canons provided that "[t]he responsibility for advising as to
questionable transactions, for bringing questionable suits, for urging
questionable defenses, is the lawyer's responsibility. He cannot escape it
by urging as an excuse that he is only following his client's instructions."' 140
The lawyer "must obey his own conscience and not that of the client."' 4'
In the period from the early twentieth century through the 1960s, the
rhetoric of aspiring to the public good remained consistent, while the
understanding of lawyers' function continued to narrow. Toward the end of
this period, growing support for the hired gun role 142 led the American Bar
Association to restate the profession's commitment to the public good. In
1958, the Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility of the American
Bar Association and the Association of American Law Schools, for which
Fuller served as co-reporter, declared the "lawyer's role" as a "trusteeship
for the integrity of those fundamental processes of government and self-
government upon which the successful functioning of our society
depends."' 143 Erwin Smigel's study of Wall Street lawyers, published in
1964, confirmed that elite lawyers endorsed a similar understanding. 144
The lawyers Smigel interviewed described themselves to be "guardians of
the law,"' 145 urging their clients to adopt "proper and moral legal
positions."' 46 Although the Joint Conference did describe a narrower
obligation to the public good than that of the early twentieth century,
Smigel's Wall Street lawyers kept alive the broader construction of
Brandeis.
III. THE RISE OF THE HIRED GUN
As the influence of liberalism continued inexorably to expand, even this
less ambitious commitment of lawyers to the public good would fade.
Following the 1960s, while bar leaders retained a rhetoric of
professionalism that was necessary to maintain self-regulation, most
137. Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 32, at 268 (quoting Canons of Prof'l Ethics
Canon 32).
138. Canons of Prof l Ethics Canon 15. (quoting Sharswood, supra note 69, at 78-79);
Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 32, at 243-47.
139. Canons of Prof'I Ethics Canon 15.
140. Id. Canon 31.
141. Id. Canon 15.
142. See e.g., Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 Stan. L. Rev. 3 (1951).
143. Fuller & Randall, supra note 115, at 1162.
144. See generally Erwin Smigel, The Wall Street Lawyer: Professional Organization
Man? (1964).
145. Pearce, supra note 20, at 381.
146. Smigel, supra note 144, at 5-6.
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lawyers abandoned the notion that they had any special obligation to the
public good, and, if they acknowledged it at all, they limited it to the
margins of practice.
The 1960s represented a watershed in American culture. While
proponents of philosophical liberalism, whether identified politically as
liberal or conservative, had been dominant in elite culture since the late
nineteenth century, certain pre-liberal conceptions, such as the public good,
had continued to coexist in a less ambitious form. The 1960s marked the
ascendance of purer forms of liberalism that questioned even a rhetorical
commitment to the public good.
On the right, Milton Friedman's libertarianism eventually eclipsed
traditional conservatism as the engine for elite conservative political
philosophy. While traditional conservatism had valued both economic
freedom and the public good, Friedman rejected the public good as
subversive of individual freedom. 147 People were fundamentally self-
interested. Claims of a public good were false and only interfered with
individuals' freedom to maximize their self-interest. Conservative
commitment to the public good did not disappear entirely. Traditional
conservatism survived, especially among religious conservatives whose
views would eventually become very influential among the public. 148 But
at the level of elite culture, those views were hard to find. Conservative
perspectives that emulated Friedman's gained ascendance in the academy
and the larger intellectual community, such as through the rise of the law
and economics movement. 149
On the left, the dominant strains of liberalism also found every individual
to be self-interested and applied skepticism to claims of values derived from
the public good. The protest movements of the 1960s cast doubt on the
legitimacy of established authority, while making the broader claim that no
person or group was better able to ascertain and pursue the public good. 150
The liberal goal was a public square that maximized individual freedom by
147. Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (1962); Milton Friedman, The Social
Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6
(Magazine), at 32 (deriding those in business who care about social responsibility as
socialism's "unwitting puppets").
148. See, e.g., Michael Kranish, Religious Right Wields Clout: Secular Groups Losing
Funding Amid Pressure, Boston.com, Oct. 9, 2006,
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/10/09/religious.right-wields-clout/;
Ramesh Ponnuru, Secularism and Its Discontents: The Debate over Religion and Politics Is
in Desperate Need of Sanity, Nat'l Rev., Dec. 27, 2004, at 32.
149. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 103, at 3-7; Kronman, supra note 109, at 231
(discussing dominant approach to law and economics); Posner, supra note 86, at 1-4. One
prominent exception is religious conservative Robert George. See, e.g., Robert P. George,
Public Reason and Political Conflict: Abortion and Homosexuality, 106 Yale L.J. 2475
(1997).
150. Louis Menand, The Thrashing of Professionalism, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1995, § 6
(Magazine), at 41.
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remaining neutral with regard to "competing visions of the good life. ' 151
Persons should have the freedom to live their life without others, especially
the government, imposing values upon them.152 Conceptions of the public
good should remain in the private realm. Critics of liberalism from the left
often went even further. Not content to restrict the pursuit of the public
good to the home, they labeled it a subterfuge for the naked exercise of
power and sought to banish it entirely. 153
The dominant trends in jurisprudence reflected those in elite political
philosophy. Whether law and economics on the right, liberal jurisprudence
in the middle, or critical theory on the left, they either rejected outright the
legitimacy of a public good independent of individual freedom or sought to
make the concept as thin and private as possible. The rejection of virtue
and the acceptance of majoritarianism became so complete that the
diminished role lawyers played in earlier jurisprudences, like those of Fuller
and of the legal process school, gave way to the dominance of the
Holmesian perception that lawyers were mere technicians. Lawyers largely
disappeared from jurisprudence altogether as the focus on judges became
even more pronounced. For example, in contrast to the significant attention
Fuller gave lawyers, 154 even natural law scholars such as Robert George, no
longer found it necessary to maintain a virtuous legal elite. 155 The only
exceptions to this approach were individual scholars of both jurisprudence
and the legal profession, such as David Luban 156 and Anthony Kronman, 1
57
whose works had little impact on prevailing jurisprudential perspectives.
Not surprisingly, consistent with these developments in jurisprudence
and public political philosophy, survey data and anecdotal impressions
revealed that the hired gun perspective had become dominant among
lawyers. 158 If the concept of the public good did not exist, then lawyers
could claim no special relationship to it. If all people were self-interested,
lawyers could not claim to be above self-interest. If majority rule could be
trusted, society did not require lawyers to serve as an elite leadership class.
151. Kathryn Abrams, The Progress of Passion, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 1602, 1614 (2002);
Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1181, 1187 (1994); Michael
J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 Cal. L.
Rev. 521, 521 (1989); see, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for
Citizenship, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 131, 158 (1995).
152. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Alberstein, supra note 95, at 178; Alschuler, supra note 103, at 7-8;
Kronman, supra note 109, at 240-41; Tamanaha, supra note 33, at 120-23; David Kairys,
Law and Politics, 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 243, 247 (1984); John Henry Schlegel, Notes
Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the Conference on Critical
Legal Studies, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 391, 410-11 (1984).
154. See generally Fuller & Randall, supra note 115.
155. See, e.g., Robert P. George, In Defense of Natural Law 338 (2001) (lawyers not
mentioned in index).
156. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 15.
157. See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 109.
158. Pearce, supra note 20, at 407-09.
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The hired gun conception rejected an obligation to the public good and
privileged individual autonomy. It required lawyers to advocate zealously
for their client's self-interest and to disregard their own values in order to
avoid interfering with their client's autonomy.' 59 Lawyers' role prescribed
extreme partisanship on behalf of clients within the bounds of the law and
without moral accountability for their actions or those of their clients.1 60
The bar faced a dilemma. According to professionalism, lawyers'
commitment to the public good was a precondition to self-regulation. 16 1
The bar responded in two ways. First, it continued to employ the rhetoric
of allegiance to the public good. When it became undeniable that most
lawyers were devoting themselves to their own self-interest and that of their
clients, bar leaders declared a crisis of professionalism. 162  They
implemented commissions and mandatory classes to remind lawyers of
their public obligation. 163 Second, the bar redefined legal ethics and the
public good to legitimize the hired gun view. 164
In its ethical codes, the bar minimized the centrality of the public good
and expanded the commitment to promote the client's interests. While the
1970 Code of Professional Responsibility echoed the 1908 Canons in
proudly declaring that "[l]awyers, as the guardians of the law, play a vital
role in the preservation of society,"'165 the 1983 Model Rules of
Professional Conduct identified the lawyer's first role as "a representative
of clients" and only after that "a public citizen having special responsibility
for the quality of justice,"'166 a less ambitious role than that of a leadership
class upon which the very "preservation of society' 67 depended.
Moreover, both the Code and the Rules accommodated the hired gun by
elevating the lawyer's duty to the client. The Code directed lawyers to
"represent a client zealously" within the bounds of the law and required a
lawyer "to seek the lawful objectives of his clients through reasonably
available means permitted by law and the disciplinary rules." 168 While this
159. Id. at417.
160. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 15, at xx; William H. Simon, The Practice of Justice: A
Theory of Lawyers' Ethics (1998); Schwartz, supra note 15, at 671; see also Russell Pearce,
How Law Firms Can Do Good While Doing Well (And the Answer is Not Pro Bono), 33
Fordham Urb. L.J. 211 (2005); Pearce, supra note 20, at 409.
161. See Pearce, Professional Paradigm Shift, supra note 32, at 1239-40.
162. Pearce, supra note 20, at 410-15; Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm Shift, supra
note 32, at 1254-57.
163. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Professionalism, "... In the Spirit of Public Service:" A
Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism (1986); ABA Ctr. on ProfI
Responsibility, A Guide to Professionalism Commissions (2001), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/professionalismscop_comrnission-guide.html; Rhode, supra note
22, at 1556 (describing the development of "a cottage industry of bar committees,
conferences, commissions, and centers [focusing] on this 'crisis of professionalism"').
164. See infra notes 165-76 and accompanying text.
165. Model Code of Prof'I Responsibility pmbl. (1983).
166. Model Rules of Prof'I Conduct pmbl. (2003).
167. Model Code of Prof 1 Responsibility pmbl. (1983).
168. Model Code of Prof'I Responsibility Canon 7, DR 7-101(A)-(B).
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language could have been read to permit lawyers broad discretion,'169
lawyers understood it as a command to serve the client as a hired gun. 170
The Model Rules continued to privilege this vision. Indeed, for the first
time in an ethical code, the ABA identified client representation, and not
commitment to the public good, as lawyers' primary obligation. 171
The bar further accommodated the hired gun ideal by shifting
responsibility for the public good from the average lawyer to the public
interest practitioner. In the 1960s, public interest law emerged as a separate
field of practice. It expanded from a few, small groups, such as the
NAACP and the ACLU, to include significant numbers of lawyers engaged
in a variety of causes. The bar came to embrace public interest work and to
identify public interest lawyers as role models. In doing so, the bar located
responsibility for the public good in the aptly named public interest bar and
discarded it from its historical place in ordinary practice. 172
The bar also encouraged lawyers to remove any remaining personal
obligation they felt to the public good from their everyday work and place it
in the limited confines of the new ethical duty of pro bono. Although free
legal services for those who could not afford them had long been one part
of the larger governing class ideal, the idea of the pro bono duty as a
separate ethical obligation arose in the 1970s. 173 In 1970, the Code of
Professional Responsibility became the first legal ethics code to articulate a
separate, though aspirational, ethical duty to provide pro bono legal
services. 174  While the duty remained aspirational, it received greater
attention and more detailed consideration in the Model Rules. 175
Commitment to provide a minimum number of pro bono hours, often in
conjunction with public interest firms, became a major preoccupation of the
bar's professionalism campaign, thereby compartmentalizing the public
good into the few hours a lawyer devoted to pro bono and further
legitimizing the hired gun approach to representing clients.176
But the bar's strategy of combining the rhetoric of the public good with
the hired gun perspective took a toll on lawyers and society.
Professionalism's promise that lawyers' work contributed to the public
good had provided earlier generations of lawyers with a coherent
169. Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 32, at 273-74, 273 nn. 266-68.
170. Id. at 276-78; see also text accompanying supra note 159.
171. Model Rules of Prof I Conduct pmbl. But see Monroe H. Freedman & Abbe Smith,
Understanding Lawyers' Ethics 87-89 (2d ed. 2002) (arguing that the Model Rules require
less zealous advocacy than the Model Code).
172. Pearce, supra note 20, at 417-19.
173. Id. at 419-20. See generally Howard M. Erichson, Doing Good, Doing Well, 57
Vand. L. Rev. 2087 (2004); Judith L. Maute, Changing Conceptions of Lawyers' Pro Bono
Responsibilities: From Chance Noblesse Oblige to Stated Expectations, 77 Tul. L. Rev. 91
(2002).
174. Model Code of Prof I Responsibility EC 2-25 (1981).
175. See Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon, Regulation of Lawyers: Statutes and
Standards 331-41 (discussing Model Rule 6.1 and its legislative history).
176. Pearce, supra note 20, at 419-20.
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understanding of why their work was important. As lawyers came to view
themselves as largely self-interested, the rhetoric of professionalism rang
false. 177 Absent an alternative approach to finding fulfillment in their
stressful practices, lawyers had difficulty finding reward in their work.
Their rates of job dissatisfaction, substance abuse, and anxiety-related
mental illness exceeded those for other occupations.178
Lawyers also failed their obligation to society. Even though the hired
gun ideal denied it, lawyers continued to serve as the governing class.
Aside from their continued overrepresentation in the formal institutions of
government, 179 they remained the primary intermediaries between the
people and the law through their representation of clients and their
community leadership. In that role, lawyers brought disrespect to the law
and the legal system when they pursued self-interest at the same time as
they claimed to serve the public good. To the public and to themselves,
lawyers appeared to be "hypocrites, cynics, or fools."' 80
Moreover, as hired guns who denied moral accountability, lawyers taught
clients to view the law instrumentally and to devalue obligations to
conscience and community. This approach only benefited society under a
rather pure libertarian view, like that of Milton Friedman, 181 which defined
a just society as one where individuals pursue their own self-interest within
the bounds of the letter of the law and reject the existence of moral
obligations derived from a public good. Most Americans, even those who
employed Blue State rhetoric, did not actually accept individual freedom as
the complete measure of a just society. 182 To them, the hired gun's
amorality undermined the responsibilities a community rightfully demanded
from its members.
Even within the legal system itself, the hired gun approach failed to
satisfy lawyers' responsibilities. The adversarial legal system delivers
justice and truth when each party has an equal opportunity to promote its
interests to the court. This can only occur if each party has equal access to
177. Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm Shift, supra note 32, at 1250-52.
178. Russell G. Pearce, Brian Danitz & Romelia S. Leach, Revitalizing the Lawyer-Poet:
What Lawyers Can Learn from Rock and Roll, 14 Widener L.J. 907, 914 & n.37.
179. For example, although lawyers comprise only .7% of the employed population, see
U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2006, at tbl.604 (2006),
available at
http;//www.census.gov/compendia/statab/labor-force-employment-eamings/employed-pers
ons/ (showing that lawyers represented 954,000 out of 139,252,000 employed civilians in
2004), lawyers represented approximately 40% of the members of the House of
Representatives and 64% of the Senate for the 109th Congress. See Harold W. Stanley &
Richard G. Niemi, Vital Statistics on American Politics 2005-2006 Online Edition, at tbl. 5-3
(2006), http://library.cqpress.com/vsap/document.php?id=vsap05tab5-3&type--toc&num=5.
180. Pearce, Professionalism Paradigm Shift, supra note 32, at 1274.
181. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., Thomas Frank, What's the Matter with Kansas?: How Conservatives Won
the Heart of America (2004); Jim Wallis, God's Politics: Why the Right Gets it Wrong and
the Left Doesn't Get it (2005); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Democrats Getting Lessons in Speaking
Their Values, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 2005, at A20.
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the same quality of legal services. Otherwise, unequal justice will result.
In our current system, where access to legal services is pervasively unequal,
the hired gun exacerbates injustices that a commitment to the public good
could possibly mitigate.
CONCLUSION
In a society where deep divisions exist regarding fundamental value
questions, lawyers have failed to provide leadership in healing those
divisions. A legal profession identified with the Blue State vision of
excluding values from the public square has little to contribute if the public
square is inevitably full of value conflict and debate. Indeed, even those in
the Blue State camp have begun to recognize this dilemma.183  An
increasing number of politically liberal commentators are acknowledging
what conservative and progressive critics of liberalism have long argued: 184
that the asserted effort to prevent the "impos[ition of] personal ethical
values" 185 actually conceals value judgments grounded in specific visions
of the public good.186 The legal profession, too, must abandon the Blue
State rhetoric if it is to play a leading role in helping transform value
conflicts from culture wars to civil and respectful disagreement.
All people, lawyers or not, are morally accountable for their work at the
same time as they balance their duty to the public good with their self-
interest. What makes lawyers different is not their superior moral capacity,
as lawyers have historically claimed. Rather, it is their work. As the
intermediaries between the law and the people, lawyers have both an
individual and collective responsibility for the health of the legal system
and society. Unless lawyers believe, like Milton Friedman, that the public
good consists of nothing more than maximizing individual freedom, they
must find a way to translate their public responsibility into their everyday
work. That would not require dictating to clients or overriding their
choices. It would require counseling clients on the moral implications of
their choices.
To effectively perform that role, lawyers would have to revive their
capacity to serve as a political leadership class. Engaging clients in moral
counseling would require lawyers to develop the ability to promote
dialogue among and between people of differing values. If lawyers
incorporated this ethic into their role as intermediaries between the people
183. See, e.g., George Lakoff, Don't Think of an Elephant!: Know Your Values and
Frame the Debate (2004); Barack Obama, The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming
the American Dream 43-69 (2006); Paul Waldman, Being Right Is Not Enough: What
Progressives Must Learn from Conservative Success 97 (2006); Stolberg, supra note 182;
Jim Wallis, The Message Thing, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 2005, at A19.
184. See, e.g., Sandel, supra note 6, at 122-55, 211-47.
185. Dworkin, supra note 13, at 21.
186. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 652-63 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Macedo, supra note 85, at 260-65.
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and the law, they would better serve their governing class function and
make a valuable contribution to healing the Blue State-Red State divide.
Notes & Observations
